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THE NEW PERSPECTIVE ON HEALTH:
PREVENTION AND HEALTH STANDARDS
Giandomenico Majone(*)
1. Standard-setting in a comparative perspective
The growing debate over preventive approaches to health
problems cannot proceed far without encountering issues
related to environmental and occupational health. A country's
commitment to prevention may be jUdged from the way it goes
about protecting the living and working environment of its
citizens. In this area of public policy significant changes
have taken place, during the last decade, in all major
industrialized countries. Nowhere these changes have been
more remarkable than in the United States. Here a series
of legislative enactments--the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970, the Amendments to the Clean Air Act passed in
the same year, the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, and the
Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, to mention only some--
have brought about major shifts from previous policies based
on decentralized control and voluntary compliance toward
compulsory regulation set at the national level.
In all these legislative enactments, standards appear
as the most important policy tool for the prevention of
accidents, ill health, and environmental degradation. In
(*)paculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of
Calabria, Italy, and International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria.
The present essay is an expanded version of the Kaiser Lecture
given at Yale University, October 22, 1980.
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fact, American regulatory philosophy, especially in the field
of occupational health and safety, is moving away from the
approach prevailing in West Europe--where standards are typi-
cally used as general guidelines to be flexibly interpreted
by inspectors in each particular case--, and comes closer,
in some respects, to the practice of the Soviet Union, where
standards are embodied in legally binding codes, and public
health is defined as the science of setting "optimal" health
standards.
Standards play different roles in different countries.
Also their numerical values vary a good deal from country to
country. For example, it is well known that Soviet environ-
mental and occupational health standards are typically much
more stringent than those used in the United States or West
Europe. Such cross-national variations raise a number of
questions about the nature of the standard-setting process,
as well as the cognitive, philosophic, and institutional
factors that shape it.
In this as in other areas of policy making, comparative
analysis represents a convenient method for exposing hidden
assumptions and unquestioned beliefs. More important,
comparative analysis shows that the setting of health
standards, far from being an almost mechanical process that
can be safely delegated to technicians, in reality represents
a microcosm in which national traditions, philosophies,
attitudes, and institutions are faithfully reflected.
The insights contributed by a comparative perspective
have practical implications as well as intellectual interest.
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Consider, for example, the fact that in the United States,
with its enormous scientific, technical, and financial
resources, no more than 500 chemicals can be tested each
year because of the limited availability of trained toxi-
cologists, laboratory facilities, and test animals. This
is barely sufficient to keep up with the flow of new chemicals,
let alone investigating the existing stock of well over 50,000
chemicals already in commercial use. International cooperation
in toxicological testing would have obvious benefits but
serious, if ill-understood, differences in methodology, risk
philosophies, and regulatory approaches make cooperation dif-
ficult, and even reduce the value of the limited amount of
information that is available.
Again, all industrialized and most developing countries
make extensive use of environmental and health standards, but
much of the research from which these standards are derived
is done in a handful of countries--primarily the United States
and the Soviet Union. However, independent verification and
intelligent adaptation of the research results to particular
national situations are difficult because of the abundance
of implicit assumptions and the lack of standardized procedures.
The result is a mechanical adoption of "foreign" standards,
barely disguised by ad hoc manipulations of safety factors
and other rules of thumb. Errors of fact and logic in the
original derivations are propagated and magnified in the
process .
In the field of environmental and occupational health
we may have reached a point were fine-tuning of intrinsically
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inadequate regulatory mechanisms (such as requiring formal
cost-benefit analyses in setting compulsory standards) can
only serve to impede truly innovative thinking. Probably
the most important contribution that comparative analysis
can make is disclosing the variety of institutional solutions
that are possible, and have been used or at least proposed in
different national contexts.
In the following pages I shall explore some sources of
variation in the way health standards are derived and used
in different countries--differences in cognitive paradigms,
in regulatory philosophies, and in enforcement procedures.
This analysis will provide the empirical support for some
comments about the uses and limitations of health standards.
The possibility of voluntary standards and self-regulation
will be discussed in the latter part of the paper.
2. The conceptual basis of standard-setting
The derivation of health standards in various countries
reflects, first of all, differences in the definition of what
is a state of health, as well as conflicting views concerning
the degree to which the defense mechanisms of the body can
be safely drawn upon to offset insults from toxic agents and
pollutants.
Toxicological procedures used in the West rely on the
idea that no threat to health exists so long as the exposure
does not induce a disturbance such as to overload the normal
protective mechanisms of the body. For example, the united
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States National Academy of Sciences defines non-adverse health
effects as
(1) changes that do not result in impairment of func-
tional capacity or the ability to compensate for
additional stress;
(2) changes that are reversible following cessation
of exposure if such changes occur without detectable
decrements in the ability of the organism to maintain
homeostasis; and
(3) changes that do not enhance the susceptibility of
the organism to the deleterious effects of other
environmental influences. (1)
According to Soviet biological philosophy, any change in
response to stimulus represents an unacceptable deviation from
normal conditions, and any concentration, however small, places
an undesirable toxic or nuisance stress on the organism. Thus,
a potential for ill health is said to exist as soon as the
organism undergoes the first detectable change of whatever
kind from its normal state. (2)
To better visualize these conceptual differences, imagine
the familiar dose-response curve as being subdivided into
three zones: an upper zone corresponding to high doses of a
toxic substance, where ill effects due to exposure are clearly
detectable; a compensatory zone where the body adjusts to the
stresses imposed by lower levels of exposure, but at some cost;
finally, a lower, homeostatic zone where the adjustments are
automatic. According to the biological philosophy prevailing
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in the West, the defense mechanisms in the compensatory zone,
as well as the normal adaptive processes in the homeostatic
zone, can be safely drawn upon, within limits, to offset the
levels of stress imposed by minimum exposure to hazardous
agents at the workplace and in the environment, just as they
are called upon to counter the wear and tear of ordinary life.
Hence, dose-response relationships are extrapolated downward
from the zone of demonstrable health burdens to a point of
"non-detectable" ill effects. (3)
Soviet toxicologists start at the other hand of the dose-
response curve, moving upward from zero dose and a corresponding
initial benchmark of normality in the test organism. The
permissible level of exposure is established below the lowest
dose needed to induce a statistically significant difference
from the normal state, as revealed by highly sensitive measures
of behavioral response. The assumption underlying this proce-
dure is that the protective mechanisms in both homeostatic and
compensatory zone should be kept in reserve to take care of
unexpected insults, and their effectiveness should not be
weakened by the continuous demands of stress knowingly permitted
in the environment or at the workplace.
Neither the Soviet nor the western position can be dis-
missed as being unreasonable or contrary to known biological
laws, but the practical implications in terms of acceptable
levels of exposure are vastly different in the two cases. The
official goal of Soviet standard-setters is a zero level of
exposure. By contrast, goals of zero exposure have not been
seriously discussed in the United States or in other countries
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in the West, except for radiation protection and for carcino-
. h k 1 (4)gens ln t e wor pace.
Conceptual differences concerning the nature of health
and the adaptive capacity of the human organism, are magnified
by differences in research techniques. Soviet toxicologists
place major emphasis on the study of the effects of toxic agents
on the nervous system. Central nervous system sensitivity
(conditioned reflexes, electroencephalogram) and reflex responses
(changes in heart and respiratory rate, in blood pressure, and
so on) playa central role in standard setting.
of a Soviet expert,
In the words
We attach great significance to chronic changes in the
higher nervous activity of animals under the influence
of toxic substances in the air they breathe. We believe
that changes in the functioning of the cortex of the
cerebral emespheres occur very early, even with small
concentrations, since the cerebral cortex is highly
sensitive to the effects of external factors in the
environment ... One of the early manifestations of the
influence of various chemical substances on the higher
nervous system is the development of phasic states.
Later, disinhibition of differentiation occurs, then
individual reflexes begin to disappear and finally none
of the reflex pattern is left. When the animal is more
severely affected, the natural conditioned reflex to
sight and smell of food disappears. (5)
Because of this preoccupation with the role of the higher
nervous system as controller of all bodily activity, consid-
erable more importance is given to the pathology of this system
than is the case for Western studies. (6) Incidentally, the
interest of Soviet toxicologists for nervous system testing
and reflex behavior can be explained by the enormous influence
of Pavlovian theories on all domains of Soviet medicine. (7)
In particular, the insistence on nervous system testing is
justified by reference to Pavlov·s theory that living organisms
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adapt to their environment by means of two nervous mechanisms:
the unconditioned reflexes for the permanent features of the
environment, and the conditioned reflexes for the temporary
(conditional) features.
American and European scientists, while not fully con-
vinced that nervous system testing necessarily provides more
sensitive indicators of toxic action, agree that sophisticated
measurements of nervous system effects should be a more impor-
tant part of toxicological testing in the West. (8)
Another interesting methodological difference is the
limited role which epidemiology seems to play in standard
setting in the Soviet Union. In the West, and particularly
in the United States, epidemiology has historically provided
important, and sometime decisive, evidence on which standards
have been based; although there are indications that its role
may be decreasing relative to toxicological testing. For the
Soviets, on the other hand, epidemiological studies represent
a form of human experimentation in which prior toxicological
tests and subsequent prevention have failed. In short,
epidemiological studies represent a reactive rather than a
preventive approach. Moreover, epidemiological studies
abroad, showing health effects at higher concentrations than
those allowed in the Soviet Union, encourage continued faith
in the value of the traditional approach, based on toxicological
evidence largely derived from nervous system testing, that has
led to the lower Soviet standards. (9)
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3. Differences in regulatory philosophies
Health standards, Soviet authorities maintain, should
be based on health effects alone, without regard to the avail-
ability of adequate control technology, to economic feasibility,
or even to the ability to adequately measure the concentrations
in practice. A currently unattainable standard can still
represent a guideline for enforcement and an incentive for
future research in control technology. Conversely, since
technically or economically attainable concentrations will
coincide with harmless concentrations only by chance, standards
based on considerations of economic or technical feasibility
"can act only as an obstacle to the search for better tech-
niques, they sanction what has already been achieved
without stimulating new technical advances." (10)
Since "scientifically based" standards cannot always be
achieved, the Soviets use also secondary ("sanitary") stan-
dards that may modify, for a limited period of time, the
requirements set by the primary ("hygienic") standards.
Professor V. A. Rjazanov, a leading toxicologist, distinguishes
the two types of standards (in the context of air pollution)
in the following terms:
Hygienic standards ... must in themselves reflect the
scientifically based ideal towards which we must strive
in order to ensure that the public is not subject to
unfavorable effects from air pollution. This ideal
cannot be achieved always and everywhere at a given
time. Therefore, alongside the general hygienic stan-
dards for maximum permissible concentrations, there
may be sanitary standards of a temporary character,
serving the needs of the moment. They may modify for
a defined period the requirements for cleanliness of
the external atmosphere, taking into account economic
and technological factors ... Such air pollution
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standards are permissible temporarily, but should be
abandoned after a certain period, during which the
condition of the air must be brought into conformity
with the hygienic standards. If this approach is
adopted, hygienic standards for the cleanness of the
external air will not be used to sanction existing
technical achievement, but will represent the goal
towards which we must strive. (11)
Now, the distinction between primary and secondary
("feasible") standards is not unknown in the West. In the
united States, for example, there is the traditional distinc-
tion between criteria--expressing the available scientific
knowledge of the relationship between pollutants or toxic
substances and their adverse effects on man and his environ-
ment--and prescriptive standards, i.e., norms established by
h . . (12)some aut orlty to govern actlon.
Criteria are supposed to provide the scientific basis
for the establishment of standards, and the two stages of the
standard-setting process--the scientific and the regulatory--
are sometime kept institutionally separate. Thus, the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), in the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, has responsibility
for developing criteria, while the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA), in the Department of Labor, sets
standards guided by the criteria proposed by NIOSH.
However, the distinction between criteria and standards
does not exactly correspond to that between primary and
secondary standards. For example, NIOSH criteria are based
not only on considerations of health and safety, but also on
the feasibility of control within existing technology. (13)
It has even been claimed that NIOSH criteria and recommendations
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are often politicized, a sphere reserved for OSHA;
NIOSH is to arrive at the "best scientific judgment,"
objectively determined, on what constitutes safe
exposures. However, in two cases NIOSH recommended
criteria at variance with what was suggested by the
scientific evidence alone. NIOSH recommended 90 dBA
as an eight-hour noise exposure limit, eventually to
go down to 85 dBA. Either level clearly causes a
fair amount of hearing loss and takes no account of
nonauditory effects. The NIOSH recommendation that
the asbestos standard be set at 5 fibers per cc until
1976 ... is another example of how politicized the
"objective" recommendations of NIOSH are ... (14)
On the whole, environmental and occupational health
legislation in the United States appears to be rather incon-
sistent on the role which non-health, particularly economic,
considerations should play in the standard-setting process.
Thus, while the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Toxic Substances
Control Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (with the exception of
the Food Additives Amendment of 1958) call for some weighing
of the costs and benefits of regulation, the Clean Air Act
Amendments, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act are silent on this
issue.
Even when the law requires some balancing of costs and
benefits, the language is often ambiguous. In the case of
the OSH Act, for example, the courts had to determine whether
Section 6(b) (5) of the Act, which only speaks of feasibility
("The Secretary ... shall set the standard which most adequately
assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best
available evidence, that no employee will suffer material
impairment of health or functional capacity ... "), permits
OSHA to consider economic as well as technological factors
in setting standards for toxic substances.
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Since Congress has set few coherent guidelines on the
extent to which benefits, as well as costs and risks, must
be considered, regulators have to rely on ad hoc procedures
to balance somehow these incommensurable factors. As a
director of the Office of Toxic Substances of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency has described the process,
Usually the procedure is to postulate a numerical
standard for a toxic chemical or a specific type of
limitation on the use of the chemical, with the restric-
tion designed to reduce environmental levels to the point
that concerns over health or environmental damage dis-
appear. Then an assessment is carried out to see if the
favorable environmental impact from the restriction
warrants the concomitant economic costs. If the costs
are too high, the level of control is adjusted until an
appropriate balance is reached. (15)
Because of the ambiguity of the legislative mandate, much
current debate on health regulation has focused on whether the
benefits and costs of specific health standards should be
evaluated explicitly (possibly through a formal cost-benefit
analysis) or implicitly, through bargaining and the political
process. The outside observer cannot help being puzzled by
this preoccupation with the fine-tuning of a mechanism--
compulsory national standards--that seems to be intrinsically
incapable of dealing with the myriads of local situations and
problems that constitute the environmental or occupational-
health problem in a country of the size of the united States.
In the following pages I shall point out the limitations of
compulsory standards as tools of public health policy, and
discuss institutional conditions under which voluntary standards
may provide a more adequte solution.
- 13 -
Before proceeding with the argument, however, it should
be noted that even an unambiguous choice in favor of "health-
only" criteria, as in the Soviet model, removes only some of
the uncertainty and subjectivity that is inherent in the
standard-setting process. The inadequacy of the scientific
basis of regulation remains. For example, it has already been
mentioned that the procedures used by toxicologists to determine
"virtually safe doses" (VSD) for exposure to carcinogens involve
extrapolations downward from the range of observed effects.
Now, a variety of equally plausible mathematical functions may
be used in the extrapolation procedure, but the choice of
function has a major effect on the determination of the VSD--
more than 100,OOO-fold according to estimates of the Advisory
Committee on Safety Evaluation of the u.S. Food and Drug
Ad .. . (16 ) 11 .. h 1 fm1n1strat10n. Equa y uncerta1n 1S t e re evance 0
animal experiments for the determination of human carcinogenic
risks.
In fact, scientific certainty in regulation is so elusive
that, according to the suggestion of an experienced scientist,
All things considered, it would seem reasonable that
until better methods for the definition of relative
toxicity can be found, the role of science in regulation
should be limited to those instances where nearly certain
assessment of human risk is feasible and legitimate; at
the same time more emphasis should be given to method-
ological and basic research for future application. (17)
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4. Standard-setting and standard-using
The formal process of adoption of health standards in the
Soviet Union is quite straightforward. Government selects a
scientific review committee that surveys the literature and
exposure data, and makes recommendations to the Ministry of
Health. If the Ministry agrees, these recommendations become
nationwide regulations. Enforcement is the responsibility of
the Ministry of Health (through the Sanitary Epidemiology
Service, Sanepid), of inspectors from the All Union Councils
(primarily engineers), and of inspectors from local trade
union committees. Sanepid, with a staff of some 120,000
people, including 45,000 physicians, is responsible for both
research and practice in preventive medicine and environmental
and occupational health. Public health physicians, paramedical
personnel (feldshers), and chemists in 4,500 Sanepid stations
moni tor pollutant levels., oversee the enforcement of standards,
and participate in all health aspects of community planning.
But full enforcement of the existing standards is often
impossible because the standards are numerous and in most cases
very stringent. Hence, as already noted, temporary secondary
standards, which take economic and technical constraints into
consideration, are allowed. Conflicts between permitting a
violation and closing down a plant appear to be fairly common,
and are generally resolved through bargaining between Sanepid
inspectors, local government, and the industry in question.
According to observers from the West, the extreme step of
closing a plant is resorted to infrequently, and only after a
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period of arbitration involving the superiors of the local
Sanepid inspector and the local industry manager. (18)
The apparent contradiction between the theory and the
practice of standard-setting in the Soviet Union raises an
interesting issue. One could argue that although their primary
standards are typically much more stringent than those used in
the West, actual differences tend to disappear at the level of
enforcement. In more general terms, an approach combining
stringent standards with "reasonable" enforcement could produce
about the same results as a system of more realistic standards
but stricter enforcement.
The proposition is plausible, but unfortunately no data
are available to test it. And even if empirical testing was
possible, one should be extremely careful in drawing conclusions.
A result of "no significant difference," for example, would not
tell us much about the long-run implications of the two approaches.
Soviet regulators insist that even when their standards are not
fully satisfied, "they represent the ultimate goal and enable
us to assess, in each individual case, how far we have advanced
in this difficult task." (19) They criticize standards used in
the West for codifying existing economic and technical conditions,
to the detriment of their normative character.
The point is well taken, if one assumes that the long-term
effect of an environmental or occupational health standard should
be to channel growth away from industries and materials that are
hazardous to health and toward safer forms of production and
employment. It is, in fact, hard to see how a "feasible"
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standard can provide the necessary signals. Consider, for
example, the history of OSHA regulation of the carcinogen
vinyl chloride (VC).
In April, 1974, OSHA promulgated an Emergency Temporary
Standard (ETS) reducing the previous National Consensus Stan-
dard from 500 parts per million (ppm) to 50 ppm. The National
Consensus Standard of pre-OSHA times was a standard proposed
by the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists,
and voluntarily accepted by industry, at a time when it was
unknown that VC could induce cancer. The statement of reasons
supporting the ETS reveals that the 50 ppm standard was an
uneasy compromise between conflicting considerations and
interests.
During the summer of 1974, OSHA held extensive hearings
on the proposal of a permanent standard of 1 ppm (as a time-
weighted average over an 8-hour work period, with permissible
excursions up to 5 ppm averaged over any 15 minute period).
Although the disagreement on the medical evidence was consid-
erable, most of the debate concerned the "feasibility" of the
proposal. Industry opposed the proposed level of 1 ppm on
the grounds that OSHA lacked sufficient evidence on the harm-
fulness of VC at low doses; that it was technologically
impossible to meet the 1 ppm ceiling; and that the cost of
approaching the ceiling would force the companies out of
business. Conceding the industry's claims of infeasibility,
OSHA finally promulgated a somewhat weakened permanent
standard.
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Subsequent experience was to show that meeting the 1 ppm
level was not as difficult or costly as industry had predicted.
The permanent VC standard lacks explicit criteria of feasibility,
but a careful case study comes to the conclusion that "OSHA's
statements and actions suggest that it was following an unar-
ticulated principle that a standard is not feasible if it would
cause more than slight changes in the number of firms in an
industry, or in an industry's profit and growth rates, its
output, and competitive position." (20)
The case of the vinyl chloride standard is far from being
unique. American regulators are constantly urged to treat
economic and technical feasibility as important considerations
in the derivation of health standards. Responding to these
pressures, regulators tend increasingly to conflate the concep-
tually distinct stages of standard-setting and standard-using.
The resulting aggregation of scientific, technical, economic,
and political criteria is not only ad hoc, but also logically
inscrutable. (21) As a consequence, the meaning of the numerical
value chosen for a given standard is ambiguous, representing
neither a policy goal, nor a scientific judgment of health risk,
nor even (since the standards are supposed to be enforceable
at the national level) a measure of the level of protection
that can be reasonably achieved in specific local situations.
Whatever reservations one might have about the logic of the
distinction drawn by Soviet regulators between primary and
secondary standards, it must be admitted that at least it
allows a clear statement of objectives, while avoiding the
danger of sanctioning existing technical and economic conditions.
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So far I have stressed the differences between the Soviet
and the American approach. Despite these differences, both
countries are now committed to a regulatory structure that
relies on national mandatory standards; hence, both are faced
by the same intrinsic limitations of this method of control.
Mandatory standards focus the attention of operators and
inspectors on a small set of permissible values and approved
practices, at the expense of more comprehensive assessments
of the overall quality of ambient or workplace environment.
The logic of statutory control is such that it is difficult
to differentiate between the important and the trivial, between
form and substance. With no formal place for discretion in
technical interpretation, the situation becomes one of either
compliance or breach.
Moreover, given the limited knowledge available today in
toxicology, radiation biology, epidemiology, and related fields,
the numerical precision of current standards is spurious. At
the same time, rigid statutory control does not allow the
frequent revisions which a steady flow of new evidence would
require. Nor can general regulations be written with enough
specificity to accommodate all the unique conditions encountered
in the millions of workplaces and thousands of communities of
a large industrialized country.
Critics of the existing regulatory structure have used
the inadequacies of mandatory standards as proof of the need
to place greater reliance on economic incentives. It has been
suggested, for example, that employers be induced to provide
safer workplaces by means of an "injury tax," in the form of
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a certain percent surcharge of an employer's total injury loss,
which would raise the marginal benefits of injury prevention.
This critical literature has its counterpart in the area of
environmental problems. Here, too, the administrative approach
to pollution control, based on standards and prohibitions, has
been criticized for its lack of effectiveness, and for its
tendency to become n a political process entailing bargaining
between parties of unequal power. n (22) Effluent charges and
related price-based techniques have been proposed as alternative
approaches that by their automatism "would reduce the scope for
administrative discretion and bargaining. n (23)
But these normative conclusions overlook one important
point. The same forces that influence and distort the standard-
setting process will also affect other approaches, perhaps by
different means. The comparison between an uncorrupted system
of effluent charges (or injury taxes), and a regulatory machinery
captured by interest groups is a specious one. In fact, as I
have shown elsewhere, where effluent charges have been used,
e.g., in France, they have proved to be as subject to bargaining
and as conditioned by the institutional framework as standards,
licenses, and other administrative measures. (24)
There is no reason to believe that market-oriented approaches
to occupational safety and health would fare better. At any
rate, solutions that are (theoretically) more efficient will
also be more desirable only to the extent that economic efficiency
is accepted as the overriding criterion of public policy. In
the area of environmental and occupational health such consensus
on values seems to be lacking. Policy actors realize that the
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choice between standards and prices is not a technical choice
between policy tools that are in themselves neutral, but rather
a decision between alternative institutional frameworks which
reward different groups differently. Hence some actors may,
without being inconsistent, recognize that standards are less
efficient than economic incentives, and at the same time support
an inefficient regulatory machinery in which they have a greater
voice.
This, I would argue, is the basic reason for the support
given by American labor unions, environmentalists, and other
public interest groups to mandatory standards, set and imple-
mented by the federal government. These groups have succeeded
in bringing about significant changes from previous policies
based on decentralized controls and voluntary compliance, but
there is an ironic twist to their victory. Voluntary standards
and guidelines, such as those used in pre-OSHA days, can be
determined on the basis of "health-only" criteria since they
are not meant to be regulatory instruments, but only to supply
scientific inputs to subsequent decisions. Mandatory standards,
on the other hand, are policy tools and as such must include,
more or less explicitly, considerations of costs and benefits.
To put it bluntly, one cannot object to the intrusion of economic
and other non-health considerations in the regulatory process,
to the trading of "lives for dollars," and at the same time
insist on centralized statutory controls. Even the Soviets
have found it necessary to operate with a dual set of standards,
and it has already been suggested that their system may have
some advantages over present American practices.
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Fortunately, these are not the only possible alternatives.
At least in the area of occupational safety and health, the
West European model--in which standards are generally regarded
as guidelines, inspectors have considerable discretionary power,
and health and safety is regarded as the joint responsibility
of management and labor--prefigures interesting possibilities
of self-regulation that are absent in both the American and the
Soviet system.
5. Self-regulation
One of the most significant characteristics differentiating
the Western European from the American approach to occupational
health and safety is the greater reliance of the former on
voluntary, rather than legally enforceable, standards. Although
extensive listings of maximum acceptable concentrations (MACs)
for toxic substances and other environmental limits (many of
them of American origin) are regularly published by nongovern-
mental and public research institutes, they typically represent
nothing more than information to be used by the inspectors for
the purpose of giving preventive advice and monitoring working
conditions.
Good reasons for not embedding MAC values and other numerical
standards in legal codes have been given by the Institut National
de Securite of the French Ministry of Labor and Participation:
We consider in effect that the individual reactions
produced by a material are too unpredictable to permit
fixing in a general fashion a margin of safety; that
results obtained by animal experimentation are inapplicable
as concerns the levels obtained by this manner; that the
proposed criteria lacked comparability as to methods of
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investigation used, as well as biological response assayed
and analytical methodologies, all of which are not uniform
from one country to another or in the same country from
laboratory to laboratory. (25)
In addition to a limited number of MAC values, the Institut
National de ｓ ･ ｣ ｵ ｲ ｩ ｴ ｾ issues extensive "Fiches Toxicologiques"
giving detailed information on physical, chemical, and toxico-
logical characteristics of different substances. Private
organizations, such as the Association Interprofessionelle
des Centres Medicaux et Sociaux of the Paris region also publish
their own Fiches Toxicologiques and extensive MAC listings,
partly adapted from the lists of the American Conference of
Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH).
In the Federal Republic of Germany basic research in
occupational standards is done by the nongovernmental Commission
for the Evaluation of Toxic Materials in the Workplace (Senats-
kommission zur PrUfung gesundheitsschadlicher Arbeitsstoffe) .
The Commission was created in 1955 by the Deutsche Forschungs-
gemeinschaft--the central organ of self-management of German
scientific institutions--with the explicit goal of reducing
excessive dependence on American standards. One of the important
functions of the Commission is to provide scientific advice to
regional and national parliaments and governments, and to local
authorities. So far, the Commission has produced MAC listings
concerning more than 400 substances. These MAC values are based
only on health ｣ ｲ ｩ ｴ ･ ｲ ｩ ｡ ｾ considerations of technical or economic
feasibility are excluded.
German MAC values, like their French equivalents, are not
embedded in legal codes, and can be modified and improved at
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any moment. On the other hand, they may be made compulsory
for the purpose of occupational health control simply by pub-
lishing them in Arbeitsschutz, a specialized journal published
by the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Guide-
lines for the practical applications of the standards by federal
and state factory inspectorates are issued by a Committee for
Dangerous Materials in the Workplace (AusschuB fUr gefahrliche
Arbeitsstoffe) set up by the Ministry of Labor, and whose
membership includes representatives of the "Senatskommission."
These guidelines interpret the MAC values in the light of
existing technical and economic constraints.
In the united Kingdom, too, no specific legal status applies
to occupational health standards, but values derived from the
ACGIH threshold limit values, and from other sources, are adopted
by the H. M. Factory Inspectorate of the Department of Employment
for purposes of control and surveillance. In addition to serving
as guides for administrative action, such values may be used in
enforcement proceedings under the provisions of the Factory Act
of 1961.
From the United Kingdom have come the most articulated
proposals in recent years for a switch in emphasis away from
an extensive use of statutory regulations toward greater
reliance on voluntary standards and codes. I am referring to
Safety and Health at Work, the official report of the Parlia-
mentary Committee appointed in May, 1970 by the British Secretary
of State for Employment and Productivity under the chairmanship
of Lord Robens. (26) Among the recommendations made by the Robens
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Committee the following are particularly relevant to the present
discussion:
• Wherever practicable, regulations should be confined to
statements of broad requirements in terms of the objectives to
be achieved.
• In future, no statutory regulation should be made before
detailed consideration has been given to whether objectives
might adequately be met by a non-statutory code of practice or
standard.
• Greater emphasis should be placed on standard-setting
by means of non-statutory codes and standards. As a general
rule, statutory regulations should only be made when the alter-
native of a non-statutory code or standard has been fully
explored and found wanting.
• The whole regulatory system should be more flexibly
based and more discriminating. The means used should encourage
industry to deal with more of its own problems, thereby enabling
official regulation to be more effectively concentrated on
serious problems where strict official regulation is appropriate
and necessary. (27)
These recommendations follow from the belief that statutory
regulations are largely ineffective, intrinsically rigid, and
have a built-in tendency to quickly become obsolete. On the
other hand, "standards and codes developed within industry and
by independent bodies are, over a large part of the field, more
practical and therefore potentially more effective instruments
of progress than statutory regulations." (28) The Report
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concludes that what is needed is "less law" and more provision
for voluntary self-regulation at the plant level.
However, in order to provide credible sanctions when
needed, inspectors should have the power, without reference to
the courts, to issue formal Improvement Notices, i.e., orders
to comply not only with any relevant statutory regulation, but
also with any relevant voluntary code or standard that has been
formally approved by the Authority for Safety and Health at
Work. Voluntary codes and standards would also be admissible
evidence in proceedings before tribunals (the Report suggests
that appeals against improvement notices should be heard not
in the criminal courts but by the industrial tribunals set up
under the 1964 Industrial Training Act). In cases where serious
hazards or imminent dangers exist, the inspector could issue a
Prohibition Notice ordering that, in the event of non-compliance
within the stated time limit, the use of specified plant,
machinery, processes or premises must be discontinued, or
continued only under specific conditions.
But insuring compliance with minimum legal requirements
is not the main task of the inspectorate. Rather, inspectors
should be concerned with the broad aspects of safety and health
organization at the workplace they visit, as much as with those
narrow aspects which may have been made the subject of detailed
statutory regulations. "We believe," the Report states, "that,
as a matter of explicit policy, the provision of skilled and
impartial advice and assistance should be the leading edge of
the unified inspectorate." (29)
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The provision of advice to industry and commerce, and the
enforcement of sanctions where necessary, should be regarded
as inseparable elements of inspection work under a policy that
has as its prime objective the prevention of accidents and ill
health and the promotion of progressively better standards at
work. The success of such a policy requires close cooperation
with the people who are exposed to the risks--the workers
themselves.
It should be as natural for inspectors to discuss safety
and health problems with workpeople and their represen-
tatives as it is to discuss them with management ... We
are convinced that more cOntact and dialogue between
inspectors and workpeople would not only greatly assist
the inspectors in their day-to-day work, but would also
make an invaluable contribution towards increasing the
involvement of workpeople in the fight against safety
and health hazards. (30)
The Robens Report raises a large number of regulatory
issues that cannot be adequately dealt with in this paper.
But at least one problem must be mentioned here, for it is of
central importance from the viewpoint of comparative analysis.
To what extent the recommendations of the Committee may be
generalized to countries other than the united Kingdom? More
generally, what are the functional requisites for a viable
system of self-regulation and voluntary compliance? Three
conditions seem to be essential: (1) A critical mass of highly
qualified and uncorruptible inspectors; (2) The availability
of significant penalties for serious violations; (3) An active
concern on the part of management and workers and their repre-
sentatives for the quality of the environment in the workplace.
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In a number of countries of Western Europe these conditions
are at least approximately satisfied. (31) In particular, issues
of occupational health and safety play an increasingly important
role in collective bargaining and trade union policies. In
France and Italy, for example, unions of different ideological
persuasions have consistently refused, in recent years, to trade
off health risks with higher wages. They have also been very
active in informing their members about such risks and in mobi-
lizing public support for preventive measures. Their example
is now being followed in other European countries, as the
following episode illustrates. In 1980 the Swiss Union of
Textile, Chemical, and Paper Workers (GTCP) issued a well-written
popular report (Gesundheit am Arbeitsplatz = Health at the Work-
place) providing information about the major problems of
occupational health and stress, and outlining a model for
workers' monitoring and control of health problems at the
workplace. This includes the systematic collection of environ-
mental and health data at the plant level by means of report
cards to be mailed directly to union headquarters in ZUrich
for central evaluation. Interestingly enough Gesundheit am
Arbeitsplatz is the German translation of an analogous document
prepared by the Italian Union of Metal Workers--a politically
much more radical organization than its Swiss counterpart.
Some American analysts doubt that a system of self-
regulation would work in the United States. American inspectors
do not share the prestige and long tradition of their European
colleagues, and also their training is apparently not as good.
The pre-OSHA experience with "consensus standards" voluntarily
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adopted by industry under lax supervision by the states has been
sharply criticized by labor unions and public interest groups.
In fact, national labor organizations have been among the most
determined supporters of compulsory federal regulation. (32)
It is probably true that passage of the OSH Act has initially
strengthened the position of the union leadership in relation to
management, to the rank and file and their local representatives
(to whom financial gains are of more immediate interest than
improved working conditions), and to the unorganized member of
the workforce. Yet, even the most ardent supporters of federal
regulation cannot by now fail to see the intrinsic limitations
of the present regulatory structure. That OSHA has managed to
produce only ten health standards in ten years is something
that cannot be explained in terms of incompetence or poor manage-
ment, but has its roots in basic ambiguities in regulatory
philosophy, and in a poor choice of policy tools.
The acute dissatisfaction with OSHA's standard-setting and
enforcement activities has elicited a number of suggestions for
how policy might be improved. Among the alternative strategies
that have been proposed, regulation through collective bargaining
is perhaps the most promising. In the words of a recent writer,
... it may make sense to involve unions in abating hazards
in the workplace, rather than relying exclusively on
governmental regulation and inspection ... To the extent
that labor and management can be induced to negotiate
health and safety rules within the context of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, we can decentralize some
aspects of the regulatory intervention mechanisms almost
to the plant level. In theory, this should produce
investments in occupational health and safety, that are
both more efficient and more effective than those produced
by the present system alone. (33)
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I would like to conclude by suggesting that the rich
experience of the European labor movement in the area of
occupational health and safety could be of considerable help
in designing a strategy of regulation through collective
bargaining adapted to the American context. For this reason
that experience deserves to be carefully studied by American
analysts.
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APPENDIX
The Scientific Basis of Regulation
This appendix elaborates some technical points to which re-
ference has been made in sections 2-4 of the paper. The first
issue refers to the nature of the dose-response function and the
procedures used to extrapolate it outside the range of observed
responses.
Two main methods have been developed in order to determine
an acceptable level of risk corresponding to a given exposure to
a toxic substance. The first one involves the notion of a "no
observed effect level" (NOEL), and is the standard toxicological
procedure used in the United States and many other countries.
The NOEL is defined as the quantity of a substance administered
to a group of experimental animals at which effects observed at
high levels are absent, and at which no significant differences
between the group of animals exposed to that quantity and the
control group are produced. The acceptable level of risk is ob-
tained by dividing the NOEL by 100. This particular value of the
safety factor is commonly justified by the rule of thumb that man
may be ten times more sensitive that the experimental animals used,
and that there may be in addition a tenfold variation in sensitiv-
ity among individual animals.
For testing carcinogenic substances a second, more refined
approach has been developed. Its characteristic feature is the
use of an explicit mathematical model expressing the probability
of a lifetime response as a function of dosage D P = f(D). De-
pending on the choice of the response function f, different models
arise.
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In the following discussion a quantal response will be
assumed. This means that each experimental animal is assumed
to be characterized by a tolerance, so that any dose above it
will induce cancer and any below it will not. It is then natural
to consider the distribution of tolerances to different dose levels
over the experimental population. Thus f(D) becomes the density
of the probability distribution of responses, and the proportion
of the population that will respond to a dose level DO is given
be the cumulative function
DO
P(DO) = I f(D)dD
o
In particular P(O) = 0 (i.e., there is no spontaneous occurrence
of the particular response), and P(oo) = 1, (i.e., no immune group
exist within the population; all members will respond to sufficiently
high doses). It should be noted that not all toxicologists agree
with these particular implications of the model.
A virtually safe dose (VSD) DO is a dose level such that
P(D O) ｾ PO' where Po is some preassigned small probability such
as 10-8 or 10-6 , the latter value being the one used, for example,
by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. The VSD can be computed
-1
as P (PO), as soon as f is known.
How is the function f determined? What the experimenter ac-
tually observes is a sequence of dose levels Di , i = 1,2, ... ,n
and the corresponding proportion of responses Pi = P(Di ). The
n observed pairs (Di,Pi) can be used to interpolate the dose-
response function; outside the observed range responses are esti-
mated by extrapolation.
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Toxicity tests often show that the observed proportion of
responses increases monotonically with dose and exhibits a sig-
moid shape. This still allows many degrees of freedom in choosing
the functional form for f(O). One often-used model postulates
that the distribution of responses in the population is given by





8 2 (211) -1 /2 exp (_2.. u 2 ) d u2
where 8 1 and 82 are parameters to be estimated from the experi-
mental observations according to the maximum likelihood or some
other statistical method, and X(O) is some transformation of the
dose level 0, e.g., X = log(O).
The argument leading to the normal (probit) function is a
purely statistical one. Because of inherent biological variabil-
ity not all animals will have the same tolerance. Hence, assuming
a quantal response, at any given dose level 0 only animals with
tolerance below 0 will respond. If the distribution of responses
is assumed to be log-normal, then the probit-log dose function
results.
A different line of reasoning, this time suggested by chemical
kinetic theory, leads to another functional form, namely the logistic
curve
P (0) =
where 8, and 8 2 are again parameters to be estimated.
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Still other dose-response models have been proposed on the
basis of the so-called "hit theory" of carcinogenicity. The "one
hit" hypothesis assumes that cancer is an expression of a permanent
change in cellular genetics resulting from the interaction of one
molecule of carcinogen with a critical receptor in one cell. Under
the "multi-hit" hypothesis two or more events are necessary for in-
duction of a tumor. The single-hit model leads to
P (D) = 1 - exp (- 80) , 8 > 0
while the multi-hit model suggests the function
m k
P(O) = 1 - L (80) exp(-80)
k=O
, e > 0
where m is the minimum number of hits on a receptor required to
induce a response. More complicated expressions for the dose-
response relationship have also been suggested.
From the viewpoint of the regulator this profusion of models
is a source of embarassement rather than enlightenment since (a)
the different dose-response functions often cannot be distinguished
from each other in the observable range; (b) no firm scientific
basis at present exists for choosing among them; and (c) the choice
of function has a major effect on the VSO and hence on the level of
risk that is considered to be acceptable.
The following table, taken from the report of the Advisory
Committee on Protocols for Safety Evaluation of the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration, (1) shows the widely different results given
by three of the most frequently used models at low doses. Itshould
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be noted that these three models are hardly distinguishable in the
observed range of 5% - 95% response rates.
Dose Log-normal Log-logistic Single-hit
level model model model
0.01 0.05 0.4 0.7
0.001 0.00035 0.026 0.07
0.0001 0.0000001 0.0016 0.007
It may be argued that if there is no firm scientific basis
for choosing among the different mathematical models, then one
should prefer the safest or most conservative procedure. One
problem with the conservatism argument, as Jerome Cornfield
points out, (2) is that it is not clear where one should stop.
A no-threshold model is more conservative than one that admits
the existence of thresholds for carcinogenic effects. But with-
in the large class of no-threshold models many degrees of con-
servatism are possible. Again, in designing a toxicological
experiment one could use the most sensitive species, the most
sensitive strain within species, and so on down to the level
of the most sensitive individual animal, thus obtaining 100
percent incidence at each dose level. In short, it is diffi-
cult to be conservative in a consistent manner, unless one is
prepared to propose a zero level of exposure in each case.
As a decision rule, conservatism in the face of risk is
as unsatisfactory as the minimax or the "most likely event"
principles, or indeed any principle that does not balance ex-
pected risks against expected benefits. On the other hand,
the only consistent (Bayesian) decision procedure requires in-
formation inputs--prior probabilities of all possible scien-
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tific hypotheses, utilities for all possible consequences--which
no regulator is likely to supply.
What about determining acceptable levels of exposure on the
basis of a cost-benefit or a risk-benefit analysis? There are,
of course, well-known difficulties in quantifying benefits, costs,
and risks. The danger that the estimates represent little more
than disguised value judgments is always present. Problems of
quantification aside, a number of rather stringent conditions must
be satisfied before the cost-benefit criterion may be meaningfully
used as a decision rule in health regulation.
First, it has long been recognized that cost-benefit analysis
is not applicable under extreme circumstances, for example, when
potential health damage is so large that marginal trade-offs bet-
ween the risks and the benefits of certain kinds of activity be-
come virtually meaningless. Also, price-based marginal calcula-
tions (and the tatonnement procedures necessary to discover a
correct set of prices) are hardly appropriate when immediate action
is required. To use Martin Weitzman's example, suppose that a
certain number of airplanes is required for an emergency operation.
In strict economic terms, it would be inefficient to issue orders
to different commercial airlines to supply a given number of air-
planes, since marginal opportunity costs will typically vary from
company to company. Yet, in practical terms, this approach would
be preferable to the economically correct procedure of announcing
a price for plane services and letting profit-maximizing companies
decide on the number of planes they would be willing to commit to
the rescue operation. (3)
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A third case in which the relevance of the approach is doubt-
ful is when the biological effect of the toxicant to be regulated
becomes evident only after a long time (perhaps 20 to 30 years).
If people are unaware of such long-run effects, no externalities
are generated and the cost-benefit criterion would indicate a status
quo policy--a solution most toxicologists would consider irrespon-
sible. Moreover, persistent pollutants (like cadmium, mercury, or
radioactive wastes, which deteriorate very slowly over time) pose
particular problems, since the damage they cause arises mostly from
a non-reducible stock, while only incremental damage is caused by
the flow of pollution. Now, it is a basic assumption of the marginal
calculus that the relevant variables can be controlled in all direc-
tions. In the case of persistent pollutants the stock of pollution
is, to all practical purposes, non-reducible, so that an essential
feature of the cost-benefit approach is missing in this toxicolog-
ically important situation.
However, the most serious difficulties in using ｣ ｯ ｳ ｴ ｾ ｢ ･ ｮ ･ ｦ ｩ ｴ
criteria arise in connection with dynamic aspects of pollutant
exposure. The following considerations, which closely follow an
argument presented by David Pearce in a slightly different con-
text, (4) show that even if the threshold hypothesis is accepted,
cost-benefit ratios are not reliable guides toward a dynamically
stable situation. In Figure 1 E(x) denotes the amount of pollutant
exposure, as a function of the level of output or consumption of
a substance x, while TO is the threshold level for a representative
individual with respect to the given pollutant. We assume E' (x) > o.
B(x) is the marginal net private benefit, while CO(x) represents
marginal external costs caused by the pollutant above threshold
level TO.
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Now, given the assumption of a safe threshold at TO' the
external-costs function CO(x) has its origin at x o' where E(x)
intersects TO. Cost-benefit analysis indicates x p as the Pareto-
optimum level of output or consumption, since at x p marginal net
private benefits equal external costs. But at x p ' E(Xp ) > TO'
and this implies that the situation may be biologically unstable,
for the ability of the organism to cope successfully with the in-
sult is now impaired. Unless we assume that full biochemical
adaptation takes place, the limit of tolerance for subsequent
exposure must be set at some lower level T1 . The same argument
can now be repeated with respect to T1 and a new external-costs
function C1 (x). The new Pareto-optimal level is x p " and since
E(Xp ') > T1 , a standard set according to the cost-benefit cri-
terion would lead to a further deterioration of the biochemical
adaptability of the individual. In turn, this would cause a
further reduction of the threshold level, and so on. Zero out-
put or consumption (or, alternatively, total destruction of the
ability of the organism to adapt following pollutant exposure)
is the limiting solution of the sequence of such Paretian ad-
justments. To avoid this, it is necessary to fix the standard
in correspondence to Xo from the very beginning and this is what
regulators attempt to do in practice. What our argument shows
is that a stable standard could not be derived from cost-benefit
consideration, since these fail to take into account the impact
of an allegedly optimal solution on the dynamics of biochemical
adaption. Hence, the cost-benefit approach can have only limited






Figure 1: Threshold Values and Cost-Benefit Analysis
(Source: Adapted from D. Pearce, Kyklos, 1976).
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In sum, in the present state of knowledge risk assessment
must be regarded as a trans-scientific activity (in Alvin weinberg's
sense) since it involves questions that can be stated in scientific
language but are beyond the capacity of science to answer. At least
for the time being, regulatory decisions must be based on pruden-
tial reasoning rather than on mathematical or logical formalisms.
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